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Abstract
Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, set the stage for an appraisal of the many decades of obnoxious military rule and its consequent abuses. The widespread demand for accountability occasioned by the resurgence of civil society activism in Nigeria facilitated the formation of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission. The atmosphere led to an epoch making announcement in June 14, 1999, to constitute the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission -- popularly known as the Oputa Panel. President Olusegun Obasanjo charged the Panel to review past authoritarian regimes and the human rights abuses for the purpose of enhancing reconciliation, national cohesion and entrenching the nascent democracy. The scope of investigation spanned from 1966 to 1999. The Commission received more than 10,000 petitions representing several cases of physical and mental torture, assassination, unlawful arrest and detention, intimidation, communal violence, and disappearances were received by the Panel. Of the total received petitions, only about 340 cases were heard. Faced with many hurdles, the commission almost halted its work. However, at the end, the Panel submitted a report of eight volumes, amounting to 15,000 pages. Findings indicated that there was gross violation of human rights perpetuated by the military ruling class. The Panel was jeopardised by the refusal of key suspects (Senior Military officers) to appear before its hearing, this was further compounded by many court injunctions to restrain the Panel. Nonetheless, the victims’ petitions were heard, to that effect, neither retributive nor restorative justice was offered to them. As tradition permits, the report will usually be published and implemented immediately. Nigerians waited patiently without recourse. Six months later, the Government of Obasanjo surprisingly annulled the report citing constitutional reasons. This research seeks to underscore the numerous challenges of truth commission as a tool for transitional justice in Nigeria with specific reflections on the Oputa panel. The research deployed qualitative method to articulate issues and intrigues that encompassed the operations and findings of the Oputa Panel. It draws attention to the underlying dangers that the unresolved violations and injustices potent for national cohesion and stability in Nigeria.




Nigeria’s post-independence history began with political turbulence, divisions, fear and suspicion among Nigerians. Several military regimes left the country deeply polarized and traumatised. The country returned to democratic rule in 1999. As expected, Nigerians were about the formation of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC). Many people hoped that the Commission would solve the chronic and recurrent problems of Nigeria. The Commission was saddled with the responsibility to investigate all human rights abuses committed during military rule in Nigeria (USIP, 1999). The Nigeria’s transitional justice (Oputa Panel) effort was precisely intended to deal with the massive state sponsored and perpetration of violations of human rights during previous military regimes before the democratic rule was restored. The Oputa Panel, therefore, was the key feature of Obasanjo’s regime, which marked a complete departure from the authoritarian military rule and consequently ushered in a democratic dispensation for Nigeria (Knight, 2002). 
The Obasanjo’s idea of HRVIC is modeled as a truth commission saddled with the responsibility of unveiling wrongdoings of the post military era. The Panel was thus considered to be an answer to the many groanings of the Nigeria people for a national rebirth and the entrenchment of democracy. The establishment of the Commission was greeted with an overwhelming joy across the Country irrespective of the ethnic and religious divides endemic in the polity which indicated popular endorsement. The Commission had the mandate to investigate gross human rights violations from 15th January 1966 to 28 May 1999 and mandated to submit the report within three months from the date of the pronouncement.  This research seeks to underscore Nigeria’s attempt at transitional justice to correct the impact of military rule characterised by gross abuse of human rights and structural injustice as well as highlight the many challenges that encumbered the 1999 Oputa Panel. The research projected that unresolved issues of structural injustice and violations are the manifestations of current agitations for secession and demand for restructuring of Nigeria. It also stressed the significance of transitional justice as an unavoidable process that will guarantee sustenance of democracy and good governance in Nigeria. This research paper is organised into sections. The first gives an overview of military rule and human rights violations in Nigeria before 1999. The second section examines the concept of transitional justice, its methods, and importance with specific examples drawn from South Africa, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The third section critically reflected on the role of ECOWAS and transitional justice in West Africa. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections mainly focused on Human Rights Investigative Commission (Oputa Panel) its terms of reference, findings and challenges. Finally, concluding part of the research glaringly brought out the challenges and failure of transitional justice in Nigeria, the missed opportunities and pending issues. 
 Human Rights Abuses and Military Rule in Nigeria
The 1966 January 15th marked the first military coup d'état and the control of the government. The Military coup led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu was believed to have been motivated by the nationalistic intentions. However, subsequent events overturned that assertion. Successive military regimes perpetrated abuses and the mismanagement of national resources; characterised by structural collapse of institutions; rule of law and criminal justice system, suspension of the constitution, promulgation of decrees and the suppression of the civil societies. The weight of evidence suggests that there were indeed a lot of human rights abuses committed in post-independence Nigeria, especially during the military rule which lasted from 1966 to 1999. For the purpose of this research, 1984 will be benchmarked to highlight the intensity of human rights abuses. Bourne (2015, pp. 158-159) captured some specific incidences of abuses under Major General Muhammadu Buhari, whose regime promulgated some repressive decrees. While relying on some of the decrees he promulgated, in 1984 Umaru Dikko, a former minister under Shehu Shagari, was arrested in London, sedated, and covertly packed into a trunk-case labeled as “diplomatic baggage” intended to be smuggled into Nigeria for trial. However, luck ran out of the culprits when the British Anti-Terrorist Unit by sheer routine inspection stumbled on the crate already loaded on the Nigeria Airways plane ready to be transported into Nigeria (Maier, 2000). In addition, the late afro-beat singer Fela Anikulapo Kuti was jailed for five years on frivolous charges of illegally exporting foreign currency. As a way of harsh punishment, Buhari introduced capital punishment where purported convicts of robbery and drug traffickers were openly executed by the military firing squad (Soyinka, 2007).
In August 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida toppled Muhammadu Buhari, for gross violations of human rights. He initially released most of the political detainees, scrapped the National Security Organisation and appointed Bola Ajibola, a notable human rights advocate, as minister of justice and attorney general, and thereafter annulled the Decree No. 22 which proscribed Trade Unions and Association. However, it was soon afterward that his quest for power increased, and he gradually reversed the so-called reforms.  By 1988, leaders of the Nigeria Labour Congress were arrested and detained on account of opposing the Bretton Woods policy of structural adjustment programme. Also in 1993, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASSU) had organised an industrial strike to protest the bad policies of the government.  Babangida responded with massive harassment, intimation and detention. By 19 October 1986, Nigeria woke up to the gruesome killing of Dele Giwa, the editor of Newswatch by a parcel-bomb in which the   Junta was fingered. Giwa was alleged to have had a highly incriminating document about Babangida. His death led to global outcry and panic amongst the media community (Bourne, 2015, p. 168).  
Then came the coup of General Sani Abacha in 1993.  According to Nwachukwu et al (2014), Abacha was the most brutal of all the military rulers because of the widespread of human rights violations he committed (BDHRL, 1998). It will be recalled that, at the instance of Abacha’s coup in 1993, there was the lingering crisis after the annulment of the June 12 general election, popularly won by Chief M.K.O Abiola which led to widespread agitations in Nigeria.  Abacha got Abiola, Obasanjo, and Chief Frank Kokori arrested and detained for treason. 
One of the hallmarks of Abacha’s abuse was the clampdown on the right to freedom of expression and the press. In furtherance of his brutality, on 10th November 1995, Kenule Beeson Saro Wiwa, popularly called Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight others were executed for environmental activism in Niger Delta which was considered treasonable by Abacha’s military government (Aron, 1996). The heights of tension continued, with many pro-democracy activists and their sympathizers put in detention. Several high profile assassinations of government critics were recorded like those of Rear Admiral Babatunde Elegbede (Rtd), Admiral Olu Omotehinwa, Alhaja Kudirat (MKO Abiola’s Wife), Chief Alfred Rewane, Mrs. Bisoye Tejuosho, Alhaja Suliat Adedeji, Dr. Shola Omosola to mention just a few. These dreadful events led to the mass exile of Nigerians to Europe and America (Isaac, 2010). 
In 1998, Abacha died in a mysterious way, and General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over. And on July 7, 1998, while the political negotiations to released MKO Abiola were on going, he also died during one of the meetings in which he was believed to have been poisoned. At the dawn of 1999, the political atmosphere was quite compelling with the general outcry for justice. Given the level of tensions that existed, it seemed expedient for President Obasanjo to set up the Oputa panel in order to redress the human right violations of the past. 
Transitional Justice Concept and Cases 
Transitional justice is predominantly constructed around human rights violations. Transitional justice is often associated with the challenge of how to document injustice and violations of human rights, and the necessary mechanism to deploy for reparations or reconciliation.  In a nutshell, transitional justice involves delineating narration of violations and finding the remedy (Nagy, 2008).
According to Teitel (2003), transitional justice is associated with internal political changes within a state aimed at legal responses to deal with wrong doing of preceding repressive regimes. It thrives on the idea of (re)establishing the rule of law by utilizing the mechanism of historical inquiry, prosecutions, reparation, and reform (2000). Roht-Arriaza further widens the scope of transitional justice. In her introduction to “Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century,” she added, transitional justice is ‘that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law’ (Roht-Arriaza, 2006, p. 2).   The UN Secretary-General defined transitional justice as the full range of mechanisms which may include both judicial and non-judicial methods, involving international actors at a different level or none at all, and prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations, institutional reforms, vetting and dismissals (Secretary-General, 2004). Thus, transitional justice stresses two broad ideas; retributive and restorative justice. Retributive justice emphasises bringing to account perpetrators of human rights violation while restorative justice focuses on the victims of violations and how to address their emotional, economic and social needs through compensation, forgiveness and reconciliation (ICTJ, 2017). 
A brief review of some cases of transitional justice in Africa indicated that different approaches were utilised. In South Africa for instance, to deal with the post-apartheid era, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up and patterned in a court-like manner. The TRC was set up by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. The hearing sessions were broadcast live on national television to promote consciousness among its people. In spite of the flaws attributed to the TRC, it was adjudged successful (SAHO, 2011). The Truth Commission documented forensic records of violations that cannot be disputed. The records authenticated numerous cases of rape, torture, political assassinations, deaths in detention, and the burning of human beings alive by the apartheid government. Although the TRC could not have magically united the nation but it helped to heal some pain and prevented the return to political violence, thus laying a strong foundation for peace and tranquility in South Africa (Chapman, 2007). 
Following the Rwandan genocide, transitional justice process was set up also to help heal the wounds created by the crisis. Two level approach (methodology) to transitional justice was put in place; The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (a special international court) and Gacaca courts (a community-based approach for trial based on customary laws). The significant innovation of the Gacaca traditional method was its ability to try nearly two million cases within a short period. To deal with the unconventional problem of managing cases where large number of its citizens were accused of participation in crimes against humanity, it was necessary to adopt an unconventional method, essentially based on the Rwandan traditions, in order to expedite national reconciliation, peace, curb impunity, and promote the culture of rule of law and respect for human rights (Duthie, 2008). Although the Gacaca court system offered an alternative to transitional justice mechanism, however, the problems that Gacaca courts faced, though critical, were not insurmountable. The criticism focused on unfair trials, corruption, incompetent judges, and judicial partiality. The faults of the process were over exaggerated compared to its positive impact on the polity of Rwanda (Kirkby, 2006).  
In West Africa, Sierra Leone experienced civil conflict which lasted for ten years. The war left many people raped, thousands killed, mutilated and tortured. By 1999, the Government and the Revolutionary United Front (a rebel group) signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA), a peace agreement which sought to end the civil war and establish Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  In June 2000, President Tejan Kabbah set up the commission. By the end of 2002, the TRC submitted its final report. The report discovered that corruption was the central cause of the civil war, the perpetrators were mostly adult males and the victims were mostly women and children, the common violations were forced displacements, abductions, arbitrary detentions, killings, plundering, and looting. In addition, successive government’s abuse of the use of death penalty and emergency power also contributed to the discontent and eventual conflict. The Commission, therefore, recommended deliberate fight against corruption, crafting a new bill of rights, independence of the judiciary, strengthening of the parliament, stricter control of the security forces, devolution of power and regional economic autonomy, the inclusion of youth and women for political participation and the establishment of an agency to implement reparation programs. It will be recalled that the Lomé Peace Agreement granted unconditional amnesty to all parties in the conflict which were upheld by the commission (Millar, 2011; Apori-Nkaansah, 2008).
ECOWAS and Transitional Justice in West Africa
In the 1990s, West Africa like the other African States began to experience the surging wave of democratization. The region witnessed the collapse of many autocratic regimes in countries like Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Mali and Sierra Leone. To this end, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military wing the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) apparently played important role in several military intervention and entrenchment of democratic rules. ECOWAS at its formation in 1975, was essentially an economic body but was compelled by a prevalent spat of violence in the sub-region to delve into political as well as security and conflict matters. Thus, the evolving events expanded ECOWAS’s mandate to promote democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights. These new found roles were evident in ECOWAS’s effort in Sierra Leone and Liberia to restore peace, security and governance. Nigeria played an active role in the contribution of funds, logistics, and troops. However, a critical analysis ECOWAS indicated the lack of direct involvement of the sub-regional body in transitional justice processes. Some important instruments of ECOWAS include the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999), the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. A careful look at these mechanisms confirms that transitional justice is yet to be given prominence. The adoption of transitional justice instrument offers important opportunities for ECOWAS countries to stabilise the region (Gyimah, August 2009). It is worth noting that, while a number of truth commissions were established in the sub-region, the body continued to play a back-seat role. Thus, it is opined that ECOWAS must rejig its efforts towards a regional approach to transitional Justice making as an additional protocol to cater for a wide range of post conflict and election crises in the sub-region (Olonisakin, 2008). 
Human Rights Violations Investigative Commission: The Oputa Panel
After the creation of the ‘Oputa panel’ in 1999, seven persons were appointed to steer the commission. The Commission membership included: Hon. Justice Oputa Chukwudifu Akunne, the Chairman, a renowned retired justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, credited to have chaired several panels of inquiries on issues such as customary cases, communal conflict, political and chieftaincy disputes (BLERF, 2017). Rev, Fr. Matthew Kukah served as the Secretary-General, a Catholic priest highly respected for his ecumenical work and academic research on conflict studies, religion, politics and human rights (Kukah, 2003). Other members were prominent Nigerians like Mrs. Elizabeth Pam, Dr. Mudiaga Odje, Barrister Bala Ngilari, Mrs. Modupe Areola and Alhaji Adamu Lawal Bamalli. The authority of the president to constitute the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission was derived from the Tribunal of Inquiry Act Cap.447 which was further re-enforced by the statutory instruments enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The president mandated the commission to effect the following within a period of three months:
i.	Identify the persons, authorities, institutions or organisations which may be held accountable for such gross violations human rights and determine the motives for the violations or abuses, the victims and society generally;
ii.	 Determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate state policy or the policy of any of its organs or institutions or whether they arose from abuses of their office by state officials or whether they were the acts of any political organisation, liberation movement or other groups or individuals; 
iii.	Recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, legislative or institutions to redress past injustices and to prevent future violations or abuses of human rights.
iv.	Make recommendations which are, in the opinion of the panel, in public interest and necessitated by the evidence (Nwagwu, 2006, p. 239). 
The Commission received over 10,000 memoranda which were categorized into physical and mental torture, unlawful arrest and detention, intimidation/harassment, murder/assassination, assault/battery, communal violence, and disappearance. During the pre-hearing meetings of the commission and its consultants, they selected some action plans for implementation:
1.	Interactive sessions and lectures throughout the Country to explain the essence of   Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission.
2.	To organise an international conference on truth commission with people across the world who had benefited from transitional justice process to share their stories.
3.	To visit the TRC Secretariat in South Africa
4.	To assemble scholars and researchers from different fields drawn from Universities and Research Institutes in Nigeria.
5.	To establish public hearings mechanism as a strategy to hear and dispense the petitions. 

Reflections on the Oputa Panel Findings
The Panel’s findings were not without controversy.  Some critics of the Oputa Panel argued that it was not an accurate representation of Nigeria’s widespread national challenges (national question). This position was an understandable reaction because of the multiplicity of ethnic interest. The report of the Commission reaffirmed that Nigeria was a militarized society and as a result of the prolonged military rule human rights abuses became imminent. The report stated that “the data and evidence, which the Commission gathered, very indisputably showed that the military was primarily responsible for the persistence of human rights violations in the country” (HRVIC, 2002, p. 48). Consequently, the commission recommended institutional reforms, in addition to the further investigation and prosecution of 150 criminal cases (Pilay, 2007, p. 20). Among the cases recommended to be investigated were the murder case of   Dele Giwa, Chief MKO Abiola and Chief Kudirat Abiola (Oderemi, 2005). The commission further indicted the last military government of Abdulsalami Abubakar alongside several high-ranking military officers for the systematic institutionalisation of human rights violations in Nigeria (Kayode, 2003).  
Challenges of the Oputa Panel
In a critique of the performance of the commission, Nwagwu (2006) argues that, the mandate of the commission was bogus and not feasible within the time frame defined by the terms of reference. Moreover, the commission lacked clear and definitive legal instruments for enforcement. The report of the Panel re-echoed the assertions of Nwagwu. Several factors contributed to the supposed challenges faced by the Oputa Panel, which included but not were limited to power politics, funding, time frame and the manipulation of the judiciary by the oligarch.  In his verdict Akinterinwa (2001).  Among the first set of people summoned, only President Obasanjo, General Oladipo Diya and Major Hamza Al-Mustapha (Abacha’s Chief Security Officer) appeared. General Muhammadu Buhari, General Ibrahim Babangida and Abdulsalami Abubakar disregarded the commission’s subpoena with deliberate disdain (Solanke, 2012). This behaviour generated widespread anger among human rights lawyers and Nigerians at large (Isaacs, 2001).
The Commission reportedly suffered many setbacks due to lack of budgetary provisions by the government (HRVIC, 2002, p. 27). However, the delay created a stalemate which deflated the high expectation of Nigerians, blamed on bureaucratic red-tapism (Yusuf, 2007). The government was largely indicted for clipping the wings of the commission in order to frustrate its anticipated outcome and please the military elite class. Thus, on account of continued lack of funds, the commission was forced to round off its work with only over 200 petitions heard out of the 10,000 petitions received.  Another challenge experienced by the commission was the 90 days allocated for accomplishing the task. Nonetheless, it took the commission about one year before public hearings began, thus extended the existence of the Commission to many years. The total petitions received were overwhelming to be dispensed within the stipulated 90 days allocated to the Commission for its work (Guåker, 2009). Thus, the commission exceeded the original deadline but was unable to meet expectations. 
 The presidency of Obasanjo was accused of allegedly setting up the commission without showing the commitment to uphold its report. He was believed to have been subsumed in a high power politics to thwart the process of commission induced by the powerful the military class. To buttress that accusation, Falana argued that at no time did the Supreme Court annulled the commission’s report.  Instead, it reinforced the legality of the commission under the African Charter of Human Rights in addition to the International treaties ratified by Nigeria. Finally, the refusal of the government to publish the Commission’s final report remained questionable. The Secretary of the Commission was quoted as saying “I believe that the inability of the President to work assiduously towards releasing the report to the public was a disservice and I have no doubt that it diminished the public appreciation of the work of the commission” (Kukah, 2010, p. 182).
 Events across the country at that time further indict the government’s commitment to curbing human rights violations in Nigeria. The gruesome killings in Odi and Zaki Biam (Aaron, 2010). On 20 November 1999, a contingent of the Nigerian Army destroyed the town of Odi in Bayelsa State and killed scores of civilians in retaliation for the murder of 12 policemen by a local gang. The community was invaded by thousands of combined military personnel, who unleashed terror using heavy bombardment by artillery, aircraft, grenade launchers, mortar bombs and other sophisticated weapons. According to a government report, 43 people were killed, but this was vehemently dismissed by the Environmental Rights Action which claimed that 2,483 people were killed. The attack was clearly uncalled for, not at the time the government was embarking on a reconciliatory and restorative national program. After long hesitation, Obasanjo claimed the act was “regrettable”. However, he never paid compensation nor prosecuted the perpetrators. (Bourne, 2015, p. 212). In the same manner, in 2002, soldiers massacred thousands of people and destroyed properties worth millions of Naira (Nigeria’s currency) over the killing of a soldier by unknown persons (Ojo, 2006). The massacres in Odi and Zaki Biam challenged the very core values of Obasanjo’s moral justification to redress the 1999 Human Right Violations and Investigation Commission. 
At this juncture, it will be sufficient to affirm that, in spite of the misgivings about the success of the Commission, a number of issues were resolved. For instance, the Commission reconciled the warring communities of Maroko Village in Lagos. It also facilitated the resolution of the communal conflict between Ife and Modakeke communities in Osun State.  In addition to the peace accord among the warring factions in Ogoniland of Rivers State (Nnamani, 2011). 
The Oputa panel would have been very successful owing to the huge revelations on the gross human right violations it exhumed and accordingly reported. However, the lack of implementation of the report failed to give the needed lifeline to instill restorative and retributive justice for the victims as well as the perpetrators due to a high level of political interference. Although the essence of Oputa Panel was not fully achieved, the demand for justice will continue to linger in Nigeria. This is evident by the subsequent convocation of two national conferences; National Political Reform Conference, (NPRC) by President Obasanjo in 2005 and President Goodluck Jonathan in 2014. These conferences were preoccupied with the same issues raised during the Oputa panel, a clear indication of the unfinished job of the “Oputa Panel”.
Conclusion 
Although the recommendations of the Oputa panel were not published nor the perpetrators prosecuted, the Commission’s reports and several other research works on the subject matter suggested that the Nigerian people were still asking for justice. The volume of the petitions submitted was a clear testimony of the fact that Nigeria is burdened with many unresolved historical problems and structural injustice. Credit must be given to the panel for leadership and the management of the process. The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission was one the most important democratic step taken since independence to confront Nigeria’s national questions. It was not in dispute that the Oputa panel enjoyed the overwhelming support of Nigerians. However, it was confronted with several challenges which limited it expected outcome. The conclusion of the commission’s report outlined the processes, challenges, achievements, and recommendations. Indeed, one of the greatest impacts of the Oputa panel was the exhumation of the ugly past of Nigeria and making it open. A fascinating conclusion of the report stated that:
  “...historical understanding is not only a mirror on the past but also ...a guide to 
 the future. [W]e must be prepared to confront this history, if we are to forge ahead. 
 We need to understand it, even if it means asking unpleasant questions and offering
 blunt answers…we leave a blank space on our records against each and every one 
 of the three former Heads of State as evidence that we are leaving them and their side 
 of the story in the court of human history” 
 (HRVIC 2002: 87).

References
Aaron, F. (2010, May 26). 11 Years Of Unbroken Civil Rule: Gains, Pains, Expectations. The Tide. Retrieved April 15, 2017, from http://www.thetidenewsonline.com/2010/05/28/11-years-of-unbroken-civil-rule-gains-pains-expectations/ 
Akinterinwa, B. A. (2001. August 13). Nigeria: Oputa Panel: Sacred Cows And Immunity. Retrieved April 16, 2017, from ThisDay: http://allafrica.com/stories/200108130346.html 
Apori-Nkansah, L. (2008, February). Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Contexts: The case of Sierra Leone's Dual Accountability Mechanisms. Ph.D. Thesis. Walden University ScholarWorks.
Aron, R. (1996). Peace and War. New York: Doubleday. 
Bickford, L. (2007). Unofficial Truth Projects. Human Rights Quarterly, 29(4), 994-1035.
BLERF (2017). OPUTA Justice Chukwudifu Akunne. Retrieved from https://www.blerf.org/index.php/biography/oputa-justice-chukwudifu-akunne/
Bourne, R. (2015). Nigeria a History of a Turbulent Century. London: Zed Books.
BDHRL (1998). U.S Department of State: Nigeria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997. Retrieved April 14, 2017, from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN009247.pdf
Chapman, A. R. (2001). The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala. Human Rights Quarterly, 23, 1-43.  
Duthie, R. (2008). Toward a Development-sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2(3), 292-309.  
Guåker, E. (2009). A Study of the Nigerian Truth Commission and Why it Failed. Master's Thesis. The University of Bergen.
Gyimah, A. (2009). Gender and Transitional Justice in West Africa: The Cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone. African Leadership Centre. London: King's College London.  
HRVIC. (2002). Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission. Nigeria.
ICTJ-What is Transitional Justice? From http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (accessed September 2017).   

Isaac, A. O. (2010). When the State Kills: Political Assassinations in Abacha's Nigeria. In E. O. eds, Encountering the Nigerian State (pp. 199-216). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Isaacs, D. (2001, November 21). General Lashes out at Nigeria Rights Panel. Retrieved from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1668858.stm
Kayode, M. (2003, January 2). Oputa Panel Report Indicts Abdusalami Government Over Abiola. Sunday Punch.
Kirkby, C. (2006). Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique. Journal of African Law, 50(2), 117.
Knight, E. (2002). Facing the Past: Retrospective Justice as a Means to Promote Democracy in Nigeria. Conn. L. Rev., 35, p. 867.
Kukah, M. (2003). Human Rights in Nigeria. Hopes and Hindrances. Retrieved from Missio: https://www.missio-hilft.de/media/thema/menschenrechte/studie/14-nigeria-en.pdf
Kukah, M. (2010). Peace Versus Justice? A view from Nigeria. In C. L. Pillay, Peace Versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa (pp. 171-186). New York: Boydell and Brewer Ltd. 
Maier, K. (2000). This House Has Fallen: Crisis in Nigeria. England: Clays Ltd.
Millar, G. (2011). Local Evaluations of Justice through Truth Telling in Sierra Leone: Postwar Needs and Transitional Justice. Human Rights Review, 12 (4), 515-535.
Nagy, R. (2008). Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections. Third World Quarterly, 29(2), 275-289.
Nnamani, S. O. (2011). Institutional Mechanisms for Human Rights Protection in Nigeria: An Appraisal. Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2, 128-137.
Nwagwu, E. O. (2006). A Proposal for the Re-founding of Nigeria. What To Do After the Total Collapse of an African State. Edwin Mellen Press. 
Oderemi, K. (2005). Reopens Deaths of MKO, Kudirat, Dele Giwa, others – Oputa Panel's Report. Sunday Punch. 
Ojo, E. O. (2006). Taming the Monster: Demilitarization and Democratization in Nigeria. Armed Forces & Society, 32 (2), 254-272. 
Olonisakin, F. (2008). Conflict Dynamics in West Africa: Background Analysis for the UK Government's Africa Conflict Prevention Programme. CSDG Paper, 17. London: King’s College.   
Pillay, S. & Scanlon, H. (2007). Peace Versus Justice? Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and War Crime Tribunals in Africa. Cape Town, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Roht-Arriaza, N. (2006). The New Landscape of Transitional Justice. In (. N.-A. Mariezcurrena, Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Secretary-General, U. N. (2004). Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. New York: United Nations.
Solanke, I. (2012). Accountable Judges and their Role in Prosecuting Serious Violations of Human Rights. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6(2), 366-373.
SAHO (2011). Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Retrieved April 22, 2017, from SAHO: http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-trc
Soyinka, W. (2007). The Crimes of Buhari. Retrieved from Sahara Reporters: http://saharareporters.com/2007/01/14/crimes-buhari-wole-soyinka  
Nwachukwu, S.,  Aghamelo A., & Stanley N (2014). An Account of Human Right Violations in Nigeria: Pre-British, British and Post Independence. European Scientific Journal, 10 (10) 230-239.  
Teitel, R. G. (2002). Theoretical and International Framework: Transitional Justice in New Era. Fordham International Law Journal, 26(4), 893. 
TransLink (Director). (2012). The Footprint of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida [Motion Picture]. Accessed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y49Nt8z3kZM retrieved April 16, 2017,
USIP (1999, June 14). Truth Commission: Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/1999/06/truth-commission-nigeria  




HRVIC	Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission
USIP		United States Institute of Peace.
BDHRL	Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
SAHO		South African History Online
ICTJ		International Center for Transitional Justice 
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group 



91



